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Abstract: The knowledge of achievable fault signatures is a valuable information in designing
residual generators providing structured residual sets for fault detection and isolation. We
propose an efficient computational approach to determine the achievable fault signatures for
a given additive fault model. The proposed procedure relies on recently developed numerically
reliable nullspace updating techniques involving orthogonal reductions to Kronecker-like forms.
The new procedure is general, being applicable to both proper as well as non-proper systems,
and is significantly more efficient than an exhaustive search based approach.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider additive fault models described by input-output
representations of the form
y(λ) = Gu(λ)u(λ) + Gd(λ)d(λ) + Gf (λ)f(λ), (1)
where y(λ), u(λ), d(λ), and f(λ) are Laplace- or Z-
transformed vectors of the the p-dimensional system out-
put vector y(t), mu-dimensional control input vector
u(t), md-dimensional disturbance vector d(t), and mf -
dimensional fault vector f(t), respectively, and where
Gu(λ), Gd(λ) and Gf (λ) are the transfer-function ma-
trices (TFMs) from the control inputs to outputs, dis-
turbance inputs to outputs, and fault inputs to outputs,
respectively. According to the system type, the frequency
variable λ is either s, the complex variable in the Laplace-
transform in the case of a continuous-time system or z,
the complex variable in the Z-transform in the case of a
discrete-time system. For most of practical applications,
the TFMs Gu(λ), Gd(λ) and Gf (λ) are proper rational
matrices. However, for complete generality of our problem
settings, we will allow that these TFMs are general non-
proper rational matrices for which we will not a priori
assume any further properties (e.g., stability, full rank).
A linear residual generator (or fault detection filter) pro-
cesses the measurable system outputs y(t) and control
inputs u(t) and generates the residual signals r(t) which
serve for decision making on the presence or absence of
faults. The input-output form of this filter is
r(λ) = Q(λ)
[
y(λ)
u(λ)
]
(2)
where Q(λ) is the TFM of the filter. For a physically
realizable filter, Q(λ) must be proper (i.e., only with finite
poles) and stable (i.e., only with poles having negative real
parts for a continuous-time system or magnitudes less than
one for a discrete-time system). The (dynamic) order of
Q(λ) (also known as McMillan degree) is the dimension
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of the state vector of a minimal state-space realization of
Q(λ). The dimension q of the residual vector r(t) depends
on the fault detection problem to be solved, and can be
either given or determined during the solution process.
The residual signal r(t) in (2) generally depends via the
system outputs y(t) of all system inputs u(t), d(t) and f(t).
The residual generation system, obtained by replacing in
(2) y(λ) by its expression from (1), is given by
r(λ) = Rf (λ)f(λ) + Rd(λ)d(λ) + Ru(λ)u(λ) (3)
where
[ Rf (λ)|Rd(λ)|Ru(λ) ] := Q(λ)
[
Gf (λ) Gd(λ) Gu(λ)
0 0 Imu
]
For a successfully designed filter Q(λ), the correspond-
ing residual generation system is proper and stable and
achieves specific fault detection requirements (e.g., decou-
pling of control and disturbance inputs from the residuals).
The fault detection problem (FDP) can be formulated as
follows: Determine a physically realizable linear residual
generator filter having the general form (2) such that for
all d(t) and u(t) we have:
(i) r(t) = 0 when f(t) = 0; and
(ii) r(t) 6= 0 when any fj(t) 6= 0, for j = 1, . . . , mf .
The more advanced functionality of fault isolation (i.e.,
exact location of faults) can be often achieved by designing
a bank of scalar output fault detectors [Gertler, 1998],
where each detector solves a structured FDP. To solve
such a problem, the designed detectors must be sensitive to
some faults and insensitive to others. The basic approach
to solve the structured FDP is to reformulate it as a
standard FDP, where formally the faults to be rejected
in the residual are redefined as fictive disturbances to be
decoupled.
For a given detector with a q × (p + mu) TFM Q(λ),
let Rf (λ) be the corresponding fault-to-residual TFM in
(3). We denote Rifj (λ) the (i, j) entry of Rf (λ). Let Ωs
be a set of frequency values, which characterize one or
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several persistent fault modes (e.g., constant faults). We
can define a q ×mf structure matrix S corresponding to
a set of q residuals as
Sij = 1 if R
i
fj
(λs) 6= 0 ∀λs ∈ Ωs
Sij = −1 if ∃λs ∈ Ωs such that R
i
fj
(λs) = 0
and Rifj (λ) 6= 0
Sij = 0 if R
i
fj
(λ) = 0
For example, for constant faults we need to check Rf (λ)
for nonzero DC-gains, thus one chooses Ωs = {0} for a
continuous-time system and Ωs = {1} for a discrete-time
system.
If Sij = 1 then we say that the fault j is strongly detected
in residual i. If Sij = −1 then the fault j is only weekly
detected in residual i. The fault j is not detected in
residual i if Sij = 0. We refer to the i-th row of S as the i-
th specification, while the j-th column of S as the signature
(or code) of fault fj . This and related nomenclature used
later is borrowed from [Gertler, 1998].
The following fault detection and isolation problem (FDIP)
can be now formulated: Given a q ×mf structure matrix
S determine a bank of q stable and proper scalar output
residual generator filters
ri(λ) = Q
i(λ)
[
y(λ)
u(λ)
]
, i = 1, . . . , q (4)
such that, for all u(t) and d(t), and for i = 1, . . . , q we
have:
(i) ri(t) = 0 when fj(t) = 0, ∀ j with Sij 6= 0;
(ii) ri(t) 6= 0 when fj(t) 6= 0, ∀ j with Sij 6= 0;
(iii) ri(t) is asymptotically bounded.
Each scalar output detector Qi(λ) achieves a signature
structure representing the i-th specification in S. For
example, to achieve the complete isolation and estimation
of maximum q simultaneous faults the choice S = Iq
is necessary. In many practical applications this strong
isolation requirement can not be achieved due to the lack
of sufficient number of measurements. If we can enforce
a structure matrix with distinct fault signatures, then a
so-called week isolation of faults is possible. For example,
if for 3 fault inputs the structure matrix
S =
[
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
]
can be achieved, then the occurrence of a single fault fj can
be detected if all residuals (excepting the j-th residual) are
non-zero. More insight on how to specify fault signatures
can be found in [Gertler, 1998, 2000].
2. COMPUTATION OF ACHIEVABLE
SPECIFICATIONS
For the solution of FDIPs, the knowledge of achievable
fault signatures is very helpful in formulating FDIPs which
have guaranteed solutions. Surprisingly, the generation
of the achievable complete structure matrix for a given
system (1) has apparently not been addressed in the
literature from a procedural point of view. Traditionally
this aspect is addressed by a brute force approach, by
generating a complete set of 2mf −1 possible specifications
and determining which specifications are feasible by trying
to design an appropriate detector. A checked specification
is achievable if the corresponding design was successful. In
this way, all feasible specifications can be determined.
The design of a detector for a given specification can be
reformulated as a nullspace basis computation problem
[Frisk and Nyberg, 2001]. The typical approach is to rede-
fine all faults with zero signatures in the checked specifi-
cation as disturbances. In this way, the design problem
becomes to determine the solution of a standard FDP
and all potential solutions can be constructed as linear
combinations of the nullspace basis vectors of the TFM of
a certain extended system. Therefore, a detector formed
from all nullspace basis vectors will provide the informa-
tion if the given specification is feasible or not.
Based on these ideas, we devise a recursive procedure to
generate in a systematic and computationally efficient way
suitable nullspace bases to serve for the determination
of all achievable specifications. We illustrate the core
computation with two generic pe ×m and pe ×mf TFMs
G(λ) and F (λ), respectively. The basic computational step
consists of successively determining left annihilators Nl(λ)
of G(λ) (i.e., Nl(λ)G(λ) = 0) such that the signature of
Nl(λ)F (λ) has up to min(mf , pe − r) − 1 zero columns,
where r = rankG(λ). For example, to initialize the
procedure for the system (1), we define these TFMs as
G(λ) =
[
Gu(λ) Gd(λ)
Imu 0
]
, F (λ) =
[
Gf (λ)
0
]
(5)
with pe = p + mu and m = mu + md.
To describe the nullspace generation process more in
details, let N0l (λ) be the (pe − r) × pe proper minimal
left nullspace basis of G(λ) and let S0 be the structure
matrix of F 0(λ) := N0l (λ)F (λ), constructed according to
its definition in the previous section. If min(mf , pe−r) > 1,
then for each i = 1, . . . , mf , determine the left nullspace
N il (λ) of the i-th column of F
0(λ) and let Si be the
structure matrix corresponding to F i(λ) := N il (λ)F
0(λ).
Each Si will have the i-th column zero. If the i-th column
is zeroed with N il (λ), then N
i
l (λ) is a (pe−r−1)× (pe−r)
TFM. If now pe− r−1 > 1, we continue by computing for
each j-th column of F i(λ), j > i, the corresponding left
nullspace N j,il (λ) and the corresponding structure matrix
Sj,i of F j,i(λ) := N j,il (λ)F
i(λ). Each Sj,i will have the
i-th and j-th columns zero. This process continues in a
similar way until all Sk,...,j,i with a single row have been
generated. The resulting S is formed by concatenating
row-wise the determined S0, S1, . . ., Smf , S2,1, . . ., Smf ,1,
. . ., Smf ,mf−1, . . ..
The following tree illustrates the performed computations
for a system with mf = 3 and pe − r = 3.
F 0(λ)
F 1(λ)
F 2,1(λ)
F 3,1(λ)
F 2(λ) F 3,2(λ)
F 3(λ)
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In this case, the resulting S is formed as
S =

S0
S1
S2,1
S3,1
S2
S3,2
S3

where each Si has the i-th column zero, while each Sj,i
has the i-th and j-th columns zero. It can be observed
that the computation of F 1,2(λ) is not necessary because
the same information is provided by F 2,1(λ). Similarly, the
computation of both F 1,3(λ) and F 2,3(λ) is not necessary,
because the corresponding information is provided by
F 3,1(λ) and F 3,2(λ), respectively.
In view of software implementation, the proposed compu-
tational procedure is formulated as a recursive procedure,
which for the given matrices G(λ) and F (λ) computes the
complete structure matrix S. Formally, this procedure can
be executed as S = FDISPEC(G,F). For example, the fault
signature matrix for the system (1) can be computed with
G(λ) and F (λ) defined as in (5).
FDISPEC Procedure:
Achievable Fault Signature Computation
Inputs: pe ×m G(λ), pe ×mf F (λ); Output: q ×mf S.
Procedure S = FDISPEC(G,F)
1) Compute a left nullspace basis Nl(λ) of G(λ);
exit with empty S if Nl(λ) is empty.
2) Compute Nf (λ) = Nl(λ)F (λ).
3) Compute the signature matrix S of Nf (λ);
exit if S is a row vector.
4) For i = 1, . . . , mf
4.1) Form G˜i(λ) as column i of Nf (λ).
4.2) Form F˜i(λ) from the columns
1, . . . , i− 1, i + 1, . . . , mf of Nf (λ).
4.3) Call S˜ = FDISPEC(G˜i, F˜i).
4.4) Partition S˜ = [ S˜1 S˜2 ] such that S˜1 has i− 1
columns.
4.5) Define Ŝ = [ S˜1 0 S˜2 ] and update S ←
[
S
Ŝ
]
.
The above procedure can be easily implemented such that
it performs the minimum number of nullspace computa-
tions and updating. This number is given by the combina-
torial formula
kS =
imax∑
i=0
(
mf
i
)
, (6)
where imax = min(mf , pe − r) − 1 and r is the rank
of the initial G(λ). As it can be observed, kS depends
of the number of initial basis vectors pe − r and the
number of faults mf , and, although the number of distinct
specifications can be relatively low, still kS can be a large
number. For the example considered above, mf = 3 and
pe − r = 3, thus kS = 7 nullspace computations are
necessary.
The FDISPEC Procedure can be interpreted as an
exhaustive search for a canonical set of achievable spec-
ifications, having up to pe − r − 1 nonzero columns. The
rest of columns of each specification may also contain
additional zero entries, depending on the existing concrete
algebraic dependencies in the underlying system. Having
this in mind, it is clear that the final S obtained by the
above procedure may not explicitly contain all possible
achievable row signatures, but only implicitly, via suitable
linear combinations of the rows of S. Since each row
of S can be generated by a scalar output detector, the
linear combination of the outputs of two or more detectors
produce a signature which can be interpreted as a linear
combination of the corresponding rows of S according to
min-max algebra rules. Using such linear combinations,
the full signature list can be explicitly obtained by gener-
ating all possible such linear combinations.
The main computational ingredients necessary to imple-
ment the FDISPEC Procedure are the determination
of a left nullspace basis Nl(λ) of G(λ) at Step 1 and the
computation of Nf (λ) = Nl(λ)F (λ) at Step 2. There-
fore, the efficient implementation of this procedure heavily
benefits of the state space updating techniques recently
developed in [Varga, 2008a]. In the next section, we present
the application of these techniques to our problem and
show that a substantial gain in efficiency can be achieved
when compared with an exhaustive search based brute
force procedure.
3. COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES
In this section we address the computational issues un-
derlying the proposed FDISPEC Procedure. For com-
putations we use an equivalent descriptor state space
realization of the compound TFM [ G(λ) F (λ) ] as
[ G(λ) F (λ) ] :=
[
A− λE BG BF
C DG DF
]
(7)
with state dimension n (i.e., the order of square matrices
A and E). According to the notation (7), G(λ) and F (λ)
can be expressed as
G(λ) = C(λE −A)−1BG + DG
F (λ) = C(λE −A)−1BF + DF
(8)
In general, E can be singular in the case of an improper
system, but we will still assume that the linear pencil
A− λE is regular to guarantee the existence of the above
TFMs. For systems with proper TFMs in (8), we can
always choose a standard state space realizations where
E = I . In general, we can assume that the representation
(7), or equivalently the pair (A− λE, C) is observable.
The computational method described in [Varga, 2003] to
determine a proper rational left nullspace basis Nl(λ) of
G(λ) exploits the simple fact that Nl(λ) is a left nullspace
basis of G(λ) if and only if for a suitable Ml(λ)
Yl(λ) := [ Ml(λ) Nl(λ) ] (9)
is a left nullspace basis of the system matrix
S(λ) =
[
A− λE BG
C DG
]
. (10)
To compute Nl(λ), we determine first a left nullspace basis
Yl(λ) of S(λ) and then obtain Nl(λ) as
Nl(λ) = Yl(λ)
[
0
Ipe
]
.
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Yl(λ) and thus also Nl(λ) can be computed by employing
linear pencil reduction algorithms based on orthogonal
transformations. Let Q and Z be orthogonal matrices (for
instance, determined by using the algorithms of Beelen
[1987] or Varga [1996]) such that the transformed pencil
S˜(λ) := QS(λ)Z is in a Kronecker-like staircase form
S˜(λ) =
 Ar − λEr Ar,l − λEr,l0 Al − λEl
0 Cl
 (11)
where the descriptor pair (Al − λEl, Cl) is observable, El
is non-singular, and Ar − λEr has full row rank excepting
possibly a finite set of values of λ (i.e, the invariant zeros
of S(λ)). We can choose a left nullspace Y˜l(λ) of S˜(λ) in
the form
Y˜l(λ) =
[
0 Cl(λEl −Al)
−1 I
]
. (12)
Then the left nullspace of S(λ) is
Yl(λ) = Y˜l(λ)Q
[
0
Ipe
]
.
If we partition row-wise
Q
[
0
Ipe
]
=
[
Br,l
Bl
Dl
]
to comply with the column partitioning of Y˜l(λ) in (12),
we obtain a minimal order proper left nullspace Nl(λ) of
G(λ) with the descriptor realization
Nl(λ) =
[
Al − λEl Bl
Cl Dl
]
(13)
An important aspect of this computational procedure is
that we can explicitly write down also a realization of
Nf (λ) = Nl(λ)F (λ) [Varga, 2008a]. It is easy to show that
Yl(λ)
[
A− λE BF
C DF
]
= [ 0 Nl(λ)F (λ) ]
and thus
Nl(λ)F (λ) = Yl(λ)
[
BF
DF
]
= Y˜l(λ)Q
[
BF
DF
]
.
We compute now
Q
[
BF
DF
]
=
 ∗B˜F
D˜F
 , (14)
where the row partitioning of the right hand side corre-
sponds to the column partitioning of Y˜l(λ) in (12). The
realization of Nf (λ) = Nl(λ)F (λ) results as
Nf (λ) =
[
Al − λEl B˜F
Cl D˜F
]
. (15)
Note that both Nl(λ) and Nf (λ) share the same observable
pair (Al − λEl, Cl).
To obtain the state space realizations of both Nl(λ) and
Nf (λ), we performed exclusively orthogonal transforma-
tions on the system matrices. We can prove that all com-
puted matrices are exact for a slightly perturbed original
system matrix. It follows that the algorithm to compute
these realizations is numerically backward stable.
The structure matrix S corresponding to Nf (λ) results
by examining the transfer functions corresponding to in-
dividual entries of Nf (λ). This can be done, for example,
by checking for non-zero values at a random frequency
(for week detectability) or at all values λs ∈ Ωs (for strong
detectability). This merely involves evaluating Nf (λ) at
several frequency values.
To avoid numerical problems in evaluating Nf (λs) (e.g.,
due to poles nearby to λs), we can easily enforce the
stability of the resulting nullspace basis. This comes down
to additionally perform a similarity transformation on the
reduced pencil S˜(λ) with a left transformation matrix of
the form
U =
[
I 0 0
0 I K
0 0 I
]
and compute Ŝ(λ) := UQS(λ)Z, which is still in a
Kronecker-like staircase form
Ŝ(λ) =
 Ar − λEr Ar,l − λEr,l0 Al + KCl − λEl
0 Cl
 (16)
If we form now
UQ
[
0
Ip
]
=
[
Br,l
Bl + KDl
Dl
]
,
we obtain an alternative minimal proper rational basis in
the form
N˜l(λ) =
[
Al + KCl − λEl Bl + KDl
Cl Dl
]
(17)
In a similar way as above, we can compute the correspond-
ing realization of N˜f (λ) = N˜l(λ)F (λ) as
N˜f (λ) =
[
Al + KCl − λEl B˜F + KD˜F
Cl D˜F
]
Since the pair (Al−λEl, Cl) is observable, the generalized
eigenvalues of the pair (Al+KCl, El) can be arbitrarily as-
signed. For practical purposes, a randomly generated small
norm K is also sufficient to check the fault detectability
conditions.
For the example considered in the previous section, to
compute F 2,1(λ), the updating formulas above are em-
ployed three times, first to determine F 0(λ), then F 1(λ)
and finally F 2,1(λ). The first two computations can be
reused to compute F 2,1(λ). Similarly, to compute F 3,2(λ),
the updating formulas are employed only two times, pro-
vided the expression computed for F 0(λ) can be reused.
Finally, only F 3(λ) need to be computed, and once again
F 0(λ) can be reused. This leads to a substantial saving
of computational effort compared to the case when an
exhaustive list of possible specifications is checked in a
sequential manner.
We can easily compare the necessary computational efforts
of performing an exhaustive search using a brute force
sequential checking of all potential specifications and the
proposed recursive procedure relying on the above explicit
realizations. In a brute force procedure, each possible
specification is checked by determining a corresponding
left nullspace basis. This can be done using the above
approach, where we redefine some of faults as fictive
disturbances. If the corresponding FDP is solvable (this
check can be done easily by just checking for nonzero
columns in the input or feedthrough matrices of the state
space realization of Nf (λ)), then the tested specification is
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achievable. The minimum number of specifications to be
tested is kS given by (6). However, to discover non-generic
structures with larger number of zeros, usually a much
larger number of specification must be checked (see the
example in Section 5). For each test, we need to perform
the reduction to a Kronecker-like form of the original
system, for which we need to perform O(n3) operations.
When performing the FDISPEC Procedure, the state
dimensions of the realizations of subsequent annihilators
in a chain like N0l (λ), N
i
l (λ), N
j,i
l (λ), . . ., N
k,...,j,i
l (λ) are
non-increasing and therefore the nullspace computations
involves systems of orders n ≥ ni ≥ nj,i ≥ . . . ≥ nk,...,j,i,
respectively. It follows that even in the case when a min-
imum number of specifications are checked in the brute
search procedure, the difference in computational efforts
can be still huge, taking into account the cubic dependence
of the operation count of the problem dimension. Thus,
the usage of the proposed procedure leads to a substantial
saving of computational effort compared to the case when
an exhaustive list of possible specifications is sequentially
checked. An important feature of the new approach is that
the whole recursive computations can be performed by
using exclusively well-conditioned similarity transforma-
tions. A potential disadvantage of the new approach is the
large storage requirements, because of the need to store
the results of many intermediary computations.
4. COMPUTATION OF ASSOCIATED
INFORMATION
Besides computing the signature information, often addi-
tional information is useful for a successful synthesis of a
bank of residual generators. An important aspect is the
determination of the least order scalar output detector
corresponding to a given achievable fault signature. This
information can be determined using minimal dynamic
cover techniques as described in [Varga, 2007]. Here ad-
ditionally a suitable vector h and a corresponding K are
determined such that
hN˜l(λ) =
[
Al + KCl − λEl Bl + KDl
hCl hDl
]
(18)
has the least McMillan degree. The choice of h corresponds
to selecting linear combinations of basis vectors (e.g., rows
of N˜l(λ)) up to a given order and checking the agreement
with the corresponding signature matrix. For details on
how to select candidate h vectors, see also [Varga, 2008a].
Several performance measures for fault signatures are de-
scribed in [Gertler, 1998, page 353]. These measures can be
employed to choose among several possible specifications
when defining a desirable fault signature to solve a FDIP.
Of particular interest is the so-called sensitivity condition,
which for a given Nf (λ) can be defined as
ξ := max
j
‖Nfj (λ)‖∞/ min
j
‖Nfj (λ)‖∞
where the minimum is taken over those columns of Nf (λ)
which correspond to non-zero entries of a selected spec-
ification. For strong detectability assessment, a similar
sensitivity condition can be defined in terms of the gains
at a selected frequency λs as
ξs := max
j
‖Nfj (λs)‖2/ min
j
‖Nfj (λs)‖2
A large value of the sensitivity condition indicates po-
tential difficulties in detecting faults due to a substan-
tial gap between the maximum and minimum gains. The
definitions used in [Gertler, 1998] are more complicated,
involving the minimum values of detectable faults and even
the threshold values used for detection. The definitions
used above correspond to minimum faults normalized to
unity.
5. EXAMPLE.
This is a fourth order continuous-time system with output
dimension p = 3, and input dimensions mu = 1, md = 0
and mf = 8 which has been used by Yuan et al. [1997]
in a study to solve a FDIP for the complete achievable
structure matrix S. For completeness we reproduce the
state-space matrices here
A =

−1 1 0 0
1 −2 1 0
0 1 −2 1
0 0 1 −2
 , C =
 1 0 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 ,
Bu =

1
0
0
0
 , Bf =

1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 −1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 1

and Du = 0, Df = 0. This academic example is primarily
intended to illustrates the main advantages of the proposed
algorithm over brute force search based techniques and
the ability to easily determine useful associated informa-
tion. More realistic examples are studied, for example, in
[Varga, 2009].
First we illustrate the performance of our algorithm by
comparing it to an exhaustive search over all possible
specifications. The resulting timing values have been ob-
tained on a 3.4 GHz Pentium IV based PC with Matlab
running under Windows XP. In a first run, we checked all
28−1 = 255 possible specifications. Only 18 specifications
out of 255 are feasible. This computation took 7.4 sec-
onds. In comparison, the time required by the proposed
FDISPEC Procedure was only 1.1 seconds, which is
about twice as much as that for just checking the 18
achievable specifications. Thus, even for this very low order
system, the computational effort is about 7 times larger
for exhaustive checking than for our optimized search.
For larger order system, it is expected this difference is
substantially higher.
For the considered example, we can try to reduce the
number of specifications to be checked taking into account
the concrete problem dimensions. According to (6), there
are kS = 93 specifications containing at most 3 zeros.
Checking these 93 specifications takes 2.7 seconds only,
but only 16 specifications out of 93 are feasible. To discover
the missing 2 specifications, we need to check additionally
126 specifications having 4 or 5 zeros. Thus the minimum
amount of time required to detect all feasible specifications
is 16.3 seconds and corresponds to check 93+126 = 219
specifications out of 255.
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This example illustrates that discovering non-generic spec-
ifications can substantially increase the necessary compu-
tational effort for the exhaustive search, and therefore the
only reasonable approach is to check all 2mf − 1 possible
specifications. In contrast, the procedure proposed in this
paper is able to discover also non-generic specifications,
because at each step several specifications are determined
which contain the non-generic specifications too.
For Ωs = {0}, we computed the achievable structure
matrix S, which in comparison to that in [Yuan et al.,
1997], contains supplementary information on weekly de-
tectable specifications. For the resulting specifications we
computed the achievable least orders ni for the i-th speci-
fication as well as the corresponding sensitivity conditions
ξi and ξ
s
i . The results are presented in Table 1, where
groups of specifications with the same number of zeros are
delimited. As can be observed, there are 6 groups of specifi-
cations, where each group contains 0, 1, . . . , 5 zeros. In each
group there are respectively {1, 6, 5, 4, 1, 1} specifications
(to be compared with the generic case {1, 8, 28, 56, 0, 0}).
Table 1. Achievable specifications S
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 ni ξi ξ
s
i
#1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3.0 3.0
#2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2.0 2.0
#3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.0 2.0
#4 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2.0 2.0
#5 1 1 1 1 0 -1 1 1 2 1.7 ∞
#6 1 1 1 1 -1 0 1 1 2 2.5 ∞
#7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 3.0 3.0
#8 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 2.0 2.0
#9 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1.0 1.0
#10 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 3.0 3.0
#11 1 1 1 1 0 -1 0 1 2 1.5 ∞
#12 1 1 1 1 -1 0 0 1 2 1.5 ∞
#13 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 2.0 2.0
#14 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1.0 1.0
#15 1 1 1 0 0 -1 1 0 2 1.5 ∞
#16 1 1 1 0 -1 0 1 0 2 1.5 ∞
#17 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2.0 2.0
#18 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1.0 1.0
Each line of S has been realized by a detector of order 1 or
2 with eigenvalues {−1} or {−1,−2}. The corresponding
sensitivity conditions correspond to the best values of h
in (18). As it can be observed, several lines of S can not
be used for strong detection of all detectable faults. Of
interest for designing least order detectors is the fact that
although the total order of the resulting bank of detectors
is 32, however, the McMillan degree of the global detector
is 6. Thus, with a detector of order 6 the complete set of 18
distinct specifications can be achieved. We claim that this
is the least achievable order among all possible detectors
which provides the full structure matrix for this example.
For comparison, the ”least” order of the global detector
determined in Yuan et al. [1997] was 11.
6. CONCLUSIONS
An efficient and numerically reliable procedure has been
proposed to determine the achievable structure matrix
of a system with additive faults. The gain of efficiency
compared to a brute force search over all possible speci-
fications results both from checking a minimal number of
specifications, and also from reusing previous results by
formulating our algorithm as a recursive procedure. The
main qualitative difference between these two approaches
is that while the brute force search is done for all possible
specifications, the proposed algorithm performs a search
over all possible detectors expressed as chains of nullspaces
of decreasing dimensions and decreasing McMillan degrees.
The basis for that are efficient updating techniques of the
state-space realizations of the detectors and of faults-to-
residual TFMs. For standard state space systems, similar
updating techniques based on orthogonal reductions have
been employed by Nikoukhah [1994] as basis for solving
stochastic fault detection problems of increased complex-
ity.
The performance of the proposed method has been il-
lustrated only on an academic example. For this pur-
pose, an implementation of the FDISPEC Procedure
in Matlab based on reverse communication techniques
available in the latest version of a Fault Detection Toolbox
for Matlab [Varga, 2008b]. This tool also represented a
valuable support for the synthesis of structured residuals
for a complete fault diagnosis system of primary actuator
faults for a large transport aircraft [Varga, 2009].
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